AVP reference client, Rust

A tiny, runnable reference client for the HTTP/JSON profile. It drives the full lifecycle against a running server so you can watch every operation happen end to end. The source is one file, src/main.rs. It is a sibling of the TypeScript reference client and behaves identically.

cargo build           # compile
cargo run             # drives the flow against http://localhost:8787
cargo build --release # optimized binary at target/release/avp-reference-client

Point it at a different server with the AVP_SERVER_URL environment variable:

AVP_SERVER_URL=http://vault.example:8787 cargo run

You need a server running first. The sibling ../server is the obvious one:

cd ../server && cargo run   # listens on http://localhost:8787

The TypeScript server is wire-compatible and works just as well; point the client at it with AVP_SERVER_URL if you prefer.

What it does

In one run, with two locally generated members (alice and bob):

1. Generate keypairs, each member is a fresh Ed25519 keypair (ed25519-dalek). The base64 raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key is the member id (SPEC section 2).
2. Authenticate, the challenge -> sign nonce -> token flow. The client signs the raw nonce bytes (base64-decoded), which is exactly what a conformant server verifies.
3. createRepo, alice creates a repo as its sole member.
4. pull, once at the known version (server reports unchanged, omits the envelope) and once from version 0 (server returns the current envelope).
5. push, writes a new payload version with optimistic concurrency, then deliberately re-pushes at a stale expected version to show the conflict response.
6. addMember, alice records bob’s member entry.
7. fetchMemberKey, looks bob’s entry back up by member id (URL-encoded, because base64 ids contain + / =).
8. bob pulls, bob authenticates with his own keypair and syncs the shared repo.

Each step prints a one-line transcript entry.

Dependencies

Minimal and version-pinned (see Cargo.toml):

What is a placeholder (read this)

The envelope and wrapped-key cryptography is out of scope for this example. This client does not encrypt anything. It carries the alt payload as an opaque placeholder ciphertext and fills each member’s wrapped data key with a labelled placeholder blob. That is fine for exercising the wire contract, because the server is zero-knowledge and never decrypts what it stores, so a placeholder ciphertext round-trips identically to a real one.

A production client does the real work the server cannot:

• derive a per-repo symmetric data key,
• AES-256-GCM encrypt the alt payload, binding (repoId, payloadVersion, keyEpoch) into the AAD (SPEC section 4),
• wrap the data key to each member’s X25519 public key via X25519 + HKDF-SHA256, and
• rotate the key epoch on member removal.

See SPEC sections 4–5 and the lol.trq.alts reference implementation for that part. The only real cryptography in this example is the Ed25519 challenge signature, which is genuinely part of the wire contract.

What is simplified (do not ship this)

• Placeholder crypto. As above, no real encryption or key wrapping happens here.
• No TLS. It talks plain HTTP to localhost by default. A real client uses HTTPS; bearer tokens are credentials and the transport MUST be TLS (SPEC section 12).
• Single process, no persistence. It generates fresh keypairs each run and keeps no state.
• No anti-MITM key-binding verification. A production client SHOULD (and, off a host it does not operate, MUST) verify MemberEntry.keyBindingSig before wrapping a data key to a served member entry (SPEC section 9). This example skips that step.

License

MIT (SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT).